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Historically, the debate on citizen security has swung between two poles, both regionally and globally: the “iron fist” or “tough on crime” on the one hand and a social approach to structural causes of crime on the other. Citizen pressure to achieve rapid results and media coverage of high-profile crimes have led many governments to take a hard line and position themselves in the first camp. A harsher and more militarized type of policing, longer prison sentences, and massive incarceration are examples of this punitive view of crime. According to this view, the greater the repression and punishment, the larger the reduction of crime. The opposite side argues that the focus should be on changing the structural causes of crime and violence. Government programs aim to reduce the inequality and social exclusion that favor crime and violence: school dropout, family disintegration, urban poverty, and youth unemployment, among others. Fortunately, a third way combines both preventive and punitive elements backed by scientific evidence of their impact on crime. This approach, known in the Anglo-Saxon world as smart on crime (Waller, 2014), is slowly but surely permeating thinking and practice in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

This chapter argues that before spending more, the region must learn to spend better. And to do that, it must invest more in policies aligned with this third way. Resource availability does not seem to be the main problem. In the past decade, the region increased its spending on safety and justice. However, results do not match this greater fiscal effort. The good news is that many opportunities exist to achieve better results with the same resources. This chapter shows that levels of police efficiency, for example, vary greatly between organizations in the
same country, as well as between countries. Thus, many of them are in a position to produce more services with the same resources. A second step is to make smarter choices about where resources are invested. The emphasis should be on targeted preventive programs, based on evidence of impact. Carrying out these reforms will require influential advocates capable of delivering a powerful argument in favor of smarter spending on security.

Not many public services in the region are like citizen security, where citizens’ concerns about the quality and quantity of the service are so great, and where information on allocation and efficiency of spending is so opaque and scarce. This chapter helps to narrow this knowledge gap by presenting the first analysis of the quality of public spending on security for the entire region.¹

**Fighting Crime: A Regional Priority**

Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region in the world. It has 9 percent of the population, but 33 percent of the world’s homicides. The homicide rate (24 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015) is four times the world average (Figure 7.1). Of the 50 most violent cities in the world, 43 are in the region (CCSPJP, 2018). Almost 140,000 lives are lost every year, distributed very unequally. Although Central America and the Caribbean have the highest rates in the region, just three countries in South America account for 63 percent of the cases (Brazil, 41 percent, Venezuela, 13 percent, and Colombia, 9 percent) (Figure 7.2A). Other South American countries such as Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile have low homicide rates, but very high rates of property crime (robbery and theft), which translates into high rates of general victimization (Figure 7.2B). One of every five Latin Americans has been a victim of a robbery in the past year and six of every ten robberies involved violence.

The cost of crime to regional welfare is very high, estimated at 3.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 7.3). It is no surprise then that safety has been the main concern of Latin Americans since 2010 (Figure 7.4).

¹ The few studies that exist on public spending on security in Latin America and the Caribbean focus on a subregion such as Central America (Pino, 2011) or deepen the analysis in only one country (for the case of El Salvador, see World Bank, 2012).
The Region’s Spending Profile

The region makes a significant fiscal effort in the security sector, spending 5.4 percent of its total budget, almost double the 3.3 percent of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Figure 7.5). In GDP terms, this spending represents 1.6 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean and 1.5 percent for the OECD. In per capita spending, however, at purchasing power parity (PPP) the median for the OECD ($532) is double that of Latin America and the Caribbean ($218), despite its much smaller crime problem.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC’s) International Homicide Statistics.
Note: Data include countries with armed conflicts.
Figure 7.2  Intentional Homicides and Crime Victimization in Latin America and the Caribbean

A. Intentional homicides

B. Crime victimization

Latin American and Caribbean countries invest most of their security spending on the police (63.4 percent), followed by criminal justice (22.3 percent), and then prisons (8.7 percent). In PPP dollars, this represents $74 billion on police, $26 billion on justice, $10 billion on prisons, and $6.5 billion on other security-related elements. Compared to OECD countries, the region invests proportionately about the same in police, more in

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2 The International Monetary Fund’s classifier for the order and public security function, includes as subfunctions: police, justice, and prisons. Given that spending on justice includes not only criminal but also labor, commercial, and others, 30 percent of justice spending was computed as corresponding to the criminal jurisdiction, following estimates from the literature (Jaitman and Torre, 2017).
Figure 7.5 Expenditure on Public Safety in Latin America and the Caribbean and OECD Countries, 2014

[Graph showing expenditure on public safety for various countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and OECD countries, 2014. The graph illustrates per capita expenditure and expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure and GDP for different countries.]

Source: Authors' elaboration based on official statistics, OECDSTAT and IMF World Economic Outlook.
justice, and less in prisons and other areas (particularly research and development) (Figure 7.6).

The spending profiles of countries in both Latin America and the Caribbean and the OECD vary considerably (Figure 7.7). A comparison of each country’s position with respect to the “average” of the sample shows that countries such as Argentina and Jamaica concentrate their spending more on police than the average, while Brazil and the Dominican Republic focus more on justice.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on official statistics and OECDSTAT.

Note: Argentina considers expenditure at a national level while Mexico considers expenditure at a federal level.
Analyzing the weight of each type of spending in the total and its relation to per capita GDP suggests that the more developed a country, the greater the proportion of spending on prisons (and others) compared to police and justice (Figure 7.8). This may be partly because in countries

**Figure 7.8 Spending Profile and per Capita GDP PPP, 2014**

A. Expenditure on police

B. Spending on justice system

C. Spending on prisons
with lower per capita incomes, crime rates tend to be higher; thus, police spending is prioritized over other spending.

Developed countries, on the other hand, may spend more on prisons because they are under more public pressure to guarantee basic rights for inmates (i.e., lower rates of overcrowding). There is a negative correlation between the proportion of prison spending and the rate of overcrowding, as well as between public spending per prisoner and the rate of overcrowding, which seems to support this hypothesis (Figures 7.9A and 7.9B).

Most spending is invested in personnel—between 50 and 80 percent—and mainly in the police. Median spending on personnel in Latin America and the Caribbean is 10 percentage points higher than in the OECD (80 percent vs. 70 percent, Figure 7.10). In the available sample, Chile and Peru spend the least and Paraguay and Uruguay spend the most on personnel. In all countries, except Chile, personnel spending represents a higher proportion of the police and justice sectors’ budget than of the prison budget. (Figure 7.11).

Per capita spending on security increased 34 percent between 2008 and 2015, from $196 to $262 per capita, for a group of ten countries in the region (Figure 7.12A). While some countries doubled their spending such as Costa Rica (126 percent) and Paraguay (115 percent), others had smaller increases, such as Brazil (19 percent), Honduras (20 percent), and the Dominican Republic (34 percent) (Figure 7.12B).

Per capita spending on security varies significantly among countries. In 2015, Argentina spent $583 per capita, compared to $312 by Uruguay, $313 by Brazil, $70 by Honduras, and $32 by Nicaragua (Figure 7.13).
While all countries increased their per capita spending on security, the factors that influenced this increase vary. Economic growth (light green bar in Figure 7.14) played an important role in all countries. The expansion of total public expenditure (orange bar) was positive in eight countries, particularly Paraguay (49 percent), Argentina (36 percent), and Mexico (52 percent). The weight of security spending in total spending (blue bar) increased in seven countries, particularly Costa Rica (32 percent) and Argentina (20 percent), while it fell in two: Brazil (–13.9 percent) and Nicaragua (–12.7 percent) (Figure 7.14).

Although all subsectors enjoyed higher spending during this period, the largest increase in absolute terms was for police, followed by prisons (Figure 7.15A). In relative terms, prisons received the biggest boost (169 per-
cent), while criminal justice received the least in absolute and relative terms (Figure 7.15B). In relation to the destination of spending, in the three countries where changes for 2011–2015 could be computed, the relationship between personnel, operations, and investment remained virtually unchanged.
Can Money Buy Safety?

At first blush, large increases in spending have a weak relationship with security performance indicators in the region (Figures 7.16 and 7.17). Among the countries that boosted their spending above the average between 2010 and 2012, some improved their security indicators above the average between 2012 and 2014 (bottom right quadrant), while others performed worse (top right quadrant). Additionally, while the expected negative relationship exists between changes in victimization and changes in per capita spending on security, the opposite is true for homicides. The underlying methodological challenge is to determine the relationship between these
variables: does greater spending lead to lower crime, or does higher crime lead to increased spending?

An in-depth study of Brazil using data from the 26 Brazilian states sheds light on this question and suggests that raising security spending
can significantly improve public safety. A Brazilian real (R$) 10 increase in annual state spending on per capita policing in Brazil is associated with a 0.6 percent drop in the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Considering average security spending of R$196 per capita and an average homicide rate of 29, a 1 percent increase in security spending could lead to an estimated 0.4 percent fewer homicides in Brazil. This is good

Figure 7.15 Evolution of Annual Total Spending by Subsector (selected countries), 2008–2015

A. Annual total spending in millions of US$ PPP

B. Annual total spending by subsector, base index 2008

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on official statistics.
Note: This series considers data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

Gomes (2018) uses an instrument inspired by Bartik to address endogeneity, using data from 26 Brazilian states between 2002 and 2014. The work uses average national growth spending on security to produce a measure of state public spending on security that is not related to the state homicide rate and then analyzes how this spending affects homicides at the state level.
news because it gives scope for sectoral policy actions to improve impact as the efficiency of spending in the sector increases.

Thus, the evidence reviewed so far suggests that more and better spending on public safety is needed. The magnitude of the security problem in the region, low levels of investment per capita (compared to the OECD), and the probable elasticity of crime in relation to certain inputs (such as the number of police) suggest that more public spending on
security in the region could have positive results. However, before spending more, it is important to analyze how authorities can improve efficiency and effectiveness by spending better.

**Getting More Bang for the Buck**

The higher the efficiency level of security institutions, the greater the saving of resources and, therefore, the less spending needed to improve security in the region. How can governments raise the efficiency of security services and improve their quality? A first step is to measure the efficiency of security services in each country with respect to the best country with the same level of inputs. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology calculates the level of efficiency of a country (or region, state, municipality) and its distance in relation to the efficiency frontier, which is determined by the most efficient units. This section presents the first efficiency frontier analysis for Latin American and Caribbean police services. Police services were chosen because they absorb most of the total spending on security. The DEA analysis was applied *globally*, comparing Latin America and the Caribbean with the world (but will later also be applied at the *subnational* level).

**Police Efficiency, Global and Regional**

Efficiency can be achieved in two ways: doing the same with fewer resources or doing more with the same resources. The first way allows countries to maintain the same level of output using fewer inputs. The second way, which this chapter analyzes, allows countries to maximize outputs using the same inputs. A comparison of Latin American and Caribbean police with the rest of the world gives an average relative efficiency of 70 percent (Figure 7.18), which means that by bringing efficiency to frontier levels, crime prevention in the region could be increased by 30 percent.

Police efficiency is positively correlated with per capita income levels (Figure 7.19). Countries with higher per capita income tend to have greater institutional capacity, which translates into greater efficiency in the use and allocation of resources (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,

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4 The number of police officers in each country was used as input and, as output, the reciprocal of the total number of violent and property crimes combined. Using the reciprocal value of violent and property crimes implicitly captures the level of security produced.
Figure 7.18 Public Spending Efficiency Index at Global Level

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on official statistics and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Note: Highlighted bars denote countries from Latin America and the Caribbean while the dark red bar denotes the median of the sample when ordered by efficiency level.
Figures correspond to the median value in the period 2004–2014.
The results highlight the extreme variation in the region; countries with relatively high per capita incomes—such as Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, or Barbados—are less efficient than other countries with similar income levels, such as Brazil, Mexico, or Argentina. Likewise, efficiency goes hand in hand with indicators of institutional capacity such as government effectiveness and rule of law, which indicates that greater efficiency usually comes along with improved institutional capacity (Figure 7.20).

**Context Matters for Efficiency**

Police in the region do not act in isolation; they interact constantly with socioeconomic, demographic, and institutional factors in the context in which they operate. Factors related to crime and violence such as poverty, economic inequality, unemployment, the proportion of young people in the population, or rapid urbanization are beyond the control of the police and, consequently, can influence their performance. These factors, therefore, are important to consider when measuring and comparing efficiency in countries with police with different capabilities and different socioeconomic, demographic, and institutional conditions.

After correcting for exogenous factors, differences between countries’ degrees of efficiency change and allow a more realistic comparison of performance. Figure 7.21 shows the distribution of Latin American and Caribbean countries in the global sample, with scores adjusted for
exogenous factors. For example, countries such as Barbados and Jamaica, which the previous analysis showed to be inefficient, rise considerably in the efficiency ranking when considering their more difficult socioeconomic situation relative to their peers in the region. The opposite is true of Costa Rica, which falls behind in the ranking when taking into account its better socioeconomic levels. Importantly, although most countries in the region are below median efficiency, they vary widely. Regardless of which efficiency measure is used, some countries in the region, particularly in South America, have efficiency levels above the global median. However, most still have significant room for improvement.
Figure 7.21 Public Spending Efficiency Index Adjusted by External Factors

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on official statistics and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

Note: Highlighted bars denote countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, while the dark red bar denotes the median of the sample when ordered by efficiency level. Figures correspond to the median value in the period 2004–2014.
Spotlighting the Subnational Level

Police efficiency can be measured more accurately when comparing units within the same country (at the subnational level) than when comparing between countries. The institutional, organizational, and cultural differences are easier to measure and control for. Within-country analysis also helps clarify how well police resources are allocated, and their efficiency, in all geographic corners of a country.

This section presents subnational efficiency for five countries. Figure 7.22 provides a wealth of information on the considerable differences in police efficiency between departments or provinces in all countries. The color contrasts, ranging from the darkest (highest efficiency) to the lightest (lowest efficiency) suggest that many different “countries” coexist within the same national borders. Moreover, efficiency is measured within a country, meaning even the most efficient division could probably improve if compared to the international level. Even so, in all countries, police agencies at the provincial level could significantly boost their efficiency with the same level of police inputs with better management. Moving the states or provinces of each country to the frontier would increase police efficiency 66 percent in Ecuador, 62 percent in Honduras, 40 percent in Guatemala, 32 percent in Nicaragua, and 30 percent in Mexico.

Police Organization and Efficiency

In a region with scant information on the issue, Mexico provides a rare opportunity to examine the effect of types of police organization on efficiency, using information from municipal police forces (Alda, 2018). Half of the municipalities experience reductions in efficiency from the influence of external and internal organizational factors. After controlling for socioeconomic and demographic factors, the weight of police organization still has an impact on efficiency, though lower than the one from external factors.

In Mexico, the organizational structure of municipal police forces affects the provision of security in two ways. The greater the organizational complexity, the lower the level of efficiency. In particular, the greater

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5 The outputs measured vary: in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico it is the percentage of solved crimes, while in Ecuador it is the total number of crimes prevented. The inputs measured are the total number of police officers and vehicles in all the studies; Peru and Mexico also use variables on technology (computers, tablets, telephones, etc.). See Alda (2017, 2018), and World Bank (2016).

6 These studies are not strictly comparable.
Figure 7.22  DEA Maps with Output Variation, Selected Countries

A. Honduras DEA by province, 2011  
B. Guatemala DEA by department, 2011  
C. Nicaragua DEA by department, 2011  
D. Ecuador DEA by province, 2014  
E. Mexico DEA by state, 2014  

Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Alda (2013) for Panel A; Alda (2014) for Panel B; Alda (2013) for Panel C; Alda (2017) for Panel D; and Alda (2014) for Panel E.
the functional differentiation (larger number of departments or technical units) and spatial differentiation (more stations in the territory), the lower the efficiency. Thus, excessive functional and territorial fragmentation appears to compromise efficiency. In contrast, the greater the organizational control, the higher the efficiency. In particular, the more centralized decision-making is and the more formal and organizational rules and guidelines that exist, the greater the efficiency. These results provide interesting lessons for Mexico and other countries in the region.

**Rewarding Efficiency with Resources**

Police efficiency in the region is not—on average—far worse than that of more developed countries at the aggregate level. However, the margins for moving toward the efficiency frontier at the regional, national, and subnational levels are significant. Consequently, resources should be reallocated following an efficiency criterion. At the national level, mechanisms to allocate resources to subnational governments present an opportunity. Many countries do not have a formula for determining where and how to allocate resources more efficiently. Or if they do, they do not use it well. Adopting a performance-based budget that uses efficiency-improvement metrics would help promote better performance and more efficient resource allocation by rewarding municipalities or provinces that improve the use of resources.

**Preventive, Targeted, and Informed Spending**

For every additional dollar a government has to protect its citizens, it must make a crucial decision: how can it best use this resource to protect the physical integrity of both its inhabitants and their property? Hire more police officers to increase patrols, raise their pay to increase motivation, equip forensic laboratories to capture more offenders? Invest in social programs to deter young people from embarking on criminal careers or build more prisons to accommodate more offenders for longer? The list is long. Fortunately, the academic literature agrees on three key principles to guide spending on security: preventive rather than reactive and punitive; targeted instead of dispersed; and based on scientific evidence of impact—preferably cost-benefit—instead of intuition.

**Prevention Is Best**

Preventing crime not only avoids the suffering of personal and material losses, it is also cheaper than reacting to committed crimes and their
consequences. This is common sense. When a crime is committed, the state activates four key functions on which it must spend public funds: 1) police to pursue and apprehend offenders; 2) justice services to investigate and judge criminals; 3) the sanction system to apply a punishment and promote rehabilitation; and 4) reparation services for damage to victims. This spending adds up and when compared with the cost of preventing a crime, the balance is clearly in favor of prevention. This is even truer after considering the private and social costs of the crime, and the costs of future crimes prevented. For example, intensive tutoring programs for at-risk adolescents, such as “Becoming a Man” in Chicago, resulted in 44 percent fewer arrests for violent crimes (in addition to educational improvements) (Heller et al., 2015). The cost-benefit evaluation awarded a benefit of almost eight dollars for every dollar invested (WSIPP, 2017a).

How much is currently spent on prevention? With no agreed definition of prevention or systems to record this spending, the answer is unclear. One way to measure this spending is to include only programs whose objectives specify the prevention of crime and/or violence. Measured this way, spending on prevention can represent 3 percent of total spending on security and justice, as in El Salvador in 2011 (Figure 7.23), or 10 percent annually in Chile between 2012 and 2015 (Paz Ciudadana Foundation and IDB, 2017).

To more accurately capture prevention spending, the definition should include not only social prevention programs (as in El Salvador and Chile), but also police prevention (such as hot-spot policing) and judicial prevention (such as conciliation or mediation services). Regrettably, systems for recording public accounts are not usually prepared to make these measurements.

Figure 7.23  Budget Allocation for Citizen Security, El Salvador, 2011

An expanded definition of prevention spending should also include programs that may not list prevention among their explicit objectives but promise to help reduce crime in the country. Special programs (Heckman et al., 2010) including those focused on early childhood education, parenting, and school retention, and involving conditional cash transfers, among others, can have important effects on crime prevention if they are well designed. The private and social returns from education in terms of their impact on crime reduction are estimated to exceed 20 percent (Busso et al., 2017).7

**Targeting High-Risk Places, People, and Behaviors**

The second important metric for evaluating the allocation of security spending pertains to targeting. Crime is disproportionately concentrated in a small number of high-risk places, people, and behaviors (Abt, 2017). The more that security and justice spending targets these three areas, the greater is its impact.

- **Places**: Some 50 percent of crime is concentrated in 5 percent of street segments in cities in the United States and Europe (Weisburd, 2015) and between 3 percent and 7.5 percent in Latin American cities (Jaitman and Ajzenman, 2016).

- **People**: Some 10 percent of the population is responsible for 66 percent of crimes (Martínez et al., 2017). In Boston, 1 percent of young people aged 15 to 24 were responsible for 50 percent of gunshots in the city (Braga and Winship, 2015). In Montevideo, a survey of the adolescent school population revealed that 2 percent are responsible for 70 percent of violent incidents (Trajtenberg and Eisner, 2014). Targeting prolific offenders can prevent more crimes with fewer resources.

- **Behavior**: Bearing a firearm, particularly if illegal; alcohol abuse, due to its association with violence; and association with groups of lawbreakers or gangs, increases the probability of committing crimes.8

A systematic review of studies on the spatial and criminal concentration of offenders and victims shows a consistent pattern, although the level varies depending on whether crime-free units are included or not. (Figure 7.24).

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7 Berlinski and Schady (2015) also evaluated early stimulation programs in Jamaica which resulted in lower involvement in crime.

8 WHO, 2010a.
Measuring the degree of targeting of security spending is complex. To approximate a response, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) conducted a survey in six countries to measure the targeting of citizen security and criminal justice programs. (Table 7.1). The survey found that less than half of these programs are focused on antisocial or criminal risk behaviors (100 programs, or 38 percent of programs). Moreover, targeting is much less common when it comes to high-risk places (12.5 percent).

The analytical methods and programmatic approaches for targeting exist; the challenge is to adopt them. For example, hot-spot policing has been implemented for decades around the world as a way to target high-risk places but has only recently reached the region. Targeted interventions demand the systematic and sustained incorporation of scientific knowledge and crime analysis into decision-making to reduce discretion.
and inertia. They also increase the possibility of external control and accountability. Strong political leadership is an essential condition for these changes. The COMPSTAT model in New York, and its adaptations in eight Brazilian states, are good examples of the relevance and challenges of sustained leadership. Effective leadership requires institutional capabilities (good information systems, analytically driven decision-making processes, knowledge of successful interventions, etc.), which take time to build. The region has the opportunity to move toward security policies strongly backed by data and scientific evidence. However, a cultural change is required to create the conditions for adopting a more modern citizen security paradigm.

**Science over Intuition**

The third and last metric for evaluating the quality of spending allocation has to do with using practices and programs based on evidence of their impact and a cost-benefit analysis. A robust base of scientific evidence exists on cost-effective interventions to prevent crime and violence, mainly in developed countries. The most prominent online repositories of evidence include *Blueprints for Violence Prevention* of the University of Colorado, *CrimeSolutions* of the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. government, *What Works on Crime Reduction* of the College of Policing of Great Britain, Campbell Collaborations, etc. To make this information more accessible to governments in the region, the IDB is developing a repository with evidence from more than 400 interventions.

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Table 7.1 Targeting of Citizen Security Programs, Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Country</th>
<th>Total programs</th>
<th>Places of risk</th>
<th>People at risk</th>
<th>Risk behaviors</th>
<th>Not enough targeting information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceara/Brazil</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>264</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IDB and Grupo Precisa (2018).

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9 Behn, 2014.
Any citizen security policy that aims to spend smartly needs to build and finance a portfolio of interventions based on this global evidence. Achieving this is a gradual and complex process. The first step is to compile global evidence about what works and does not work, and to develop locally adapted interventions and programs based on that knowledge. The second step is to rigorously evaluate their impact and cost-effectiveness, discarding what does not work, scaling up what works, and continuing to test innovative solutions to local problems. At the city level, the University of Chicago Crime Lab is an example of this approach. At the state level, the Washington State Institute of Public Policy (WSIPP), created by the state’s congress, stands out for its systematic application of cost-benefit analysis to policy decisions. For each component of the citizen security value chain, the interventions with the best cost-benefit ratio and the highest likelihood of working in the region were selected from the WSIPP repository (Table 7.2). Also included are popular interventions in the region whose cost-benefit is negative.

Regrettably, few programs based on evidence are adopted in Latin America and the Caribbean. Of 283 programs in six countries, only 22 (8 percent) include content or intervention techniques in their design substantiated by empirical evidence of efficacy or cost-effectiveness (Table 7.3).

Opportunities and Challenges for Spending Better

Preventive, targeted, and evidence-informed interventions have more impact when they are part of a systemic approach that integrates them into each of the three major components of the security and justice value chain: social and urban services, police services, and criminal justice services. Achieving this is not easy. Each component faces obstacles associated with the inertia of the reactive, dispersed, intuitive approach that characterizes much decision-making in Latin America and the Caribbean. This section identifies, for each component, a particular challenge and an example of the type of interventions being implemented in the region to successfully overcome the problem. Putting together an integrated portfolio of interventions that addresses all these issues is perhaps the greatest challenge of all.

Who’s in Charge? Institutional Leadership for Social and Urban Prevention

Smarter spending on social and urban policies meant to promote citizen security requires stronger government leadership. Currently, the social prevention of crime is everyone’s and nobody’s business. Most countries
lack a clear institutional “champion” that assumes this responsibility as a core part of its agenda and mandate. For different reasons, neither the ministries of social development, education, or health, nor the ministry of security, make it a priority. Consequently, targeted, evidence-informed social programs aimed at crime prevention are scarce and of poor quality. At the same time, interventions with great potential for preventing violence do not have the institutional and budgetary traction needed to adopt and implement them. A clear example is programs to prevent young people and adolescents from embarking on criminal careers. These programs are some of the most cost-effective interventions in terms of security. Many of them use a proven,  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Total benefits</th>
<th>Fiscal benefits</th>
<th>Non tax benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Benefits minus costs (NPV)</th>
<th>Cost-benefit ratio</th>
<th>Chance that benefit exceeds cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Program (Triple P-Level 4 individual)</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>2,162</td>
<td>(992)</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home visits (Nurse Family Partnership)</td>
<td>19,157</td>
<td>7,489</td>
<td>11,668</td>
<td>(10,170)</td>
<td>8,988</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community interventions (Communities that Care)</td>
<td>3,148</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>(593)</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot-spot policing**</td>
<td>518,405</td>
<td>66,942</td>
<td>451,463</td>
<td>(96,637)</td>
<td>421,768</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug treatment courts</td>
<td>13,926</td>
<td>4,888</td>
<td>9,038</td>
<td>(4,924)</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-system therapy for adolescents (MST)</td>
<td>18,965</td>
<td>4,651</td>
<td>14,284</td>
<td>(7,834)</td>
<td>11,102</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive behavioral therapy/adolescents</td>
<td>14,957</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>11,284</td>
<td>(395)</td>
<td>14,562</td>
<td>37.87</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive behavioral therapy/adults</td>
<td>8,817</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>6,085</td>
<td>(1,395)</td>
<td>7,422</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D A R E</td>
<td>(423)</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td>(239)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(478)</td>
<td>(7.71)</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scared Straight</td>
<td>(9,370)</td>
<td>(2,546)</td>
<td>(6,825)</td>
<td>(106)</td>
<td>(9,477)</td>
<td>(88.14)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WSIPP, 2017b.
Note: One additional police officer was deployed per hot spot.
A evidence-based approach called Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), which aims to change an individual’s antisocial way of thinking in favor of pro-social and constructive behaviors. CBT is a key ingredient in multiple types of interventions for different age groups, adapted to risk levels. One of its best-known applications is Multisystemic Therapy (MST). MST can reduce the probability of recidivism of an adolescent offender by up to 70 percent after 5 months of treatment in the most complex cases (Sawyer and Borduin, 2011) with net benefits of $11,000 per participant. Chile is the only Latin American country to implement MST as part of a comprehensive strategy to protect vulnerable children and adolescents (see Box 7.1).

### Table 7.3 Number of Citizen Security Programs Informed by Evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/State</th>
<th>Total programs</th>
<th>Potentially based on evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceara/Brazil</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on IDB and Grupo Precisa (2018).

### Box 7.1 Multisystemic Therapy in Chile’s 24 Hour Program

Since 2012 Chile has been implementing the “PAIF 24 Horas” program. Weekly, the police send to municipal governments a list of those children and adolescents that have been arrested or taken to police units. Victims of violations of rights are referred to the municipal Office of Protection of Rights and attended by the child protection services network. Cases admitted for law-breaking behavior are referred to a specialized team that applies a brief socio criminal risk assessment to empirically estimate the probability of reoffending. The child’s family is invited to participate in a care service whose intensity is proportional to the risk level. The highest risk cases are offered Multisystemic Therapy (MST). This component is financed by the Under-secretariat of Crime Prevention of the Interior Ministry, with the supervision and technical support of the international MST Group. Recently, a quasi-experimental study conducted by the Paz Ciudadana Foundation evaluated the impact of the program. Overall, they found statistically significant reductions in recidivism of 6 percentage points after a one year follow-up. They also found reductions of 6.5 to 13.4 percentage points for the highest-risk subgroup, and of 10.5 to 14 percentage points for young people aged 16 to 18.
Chile’s 24 Hour Program incorporated MST thanks to the financial support and technical leadership of the Under-secretariat of Crime Prevention of the Interior Ministry. Smarter spending on citizen security requires identifying and strengthening champions like this; agencies should be capable of promoting a portfolio of evidence-based social and urban prevention programs. Such a portfolio should include both targeted interventions as well as universal programs with important spillover effects on crime prevention.

**Proactive Policing**

Smarter spending on police services demands that the region replace its traditional reactive model, based on random patrolling and responding to emergencies, with a proactive approach that anticipates crime and prevents it from happening. To do this, three areas that need proper funding are: crime analysis, to identify the dynamics and concentration of crime (at spatial, individual, and behavioral levels); preventive policing strategies, to preemptively target crime concentration; and police investigation, to catch prolific offenders (Coupe, 2016).

Interventions that reduce opportunities to commit crimes in hot spots are an example of preventive strategies. Hot-spot policing (HSP) deploys police resources to places and at times with high criminal activity (Weisburd and Telep, 2014). A systematic review of 25 rigorous HSP tests found significant reductions in crime in 20 of them (Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau, 2014). Ten of the tests were randomized controlled evaluations. Cost-benefit studies show a return of more than $5 for every dollar invested.

Although HSP has spread widely in the northern hemisphere, its penetration in Latin America and the Caribbean is still very limited. An IDB survey conducted in 15 countries in the region found that only three have HSP. In Uruguay, impact evaluations already show positive results (see Box 7.2).

HSP in Uruguay is not an isolated initiative, but part of a police reform process that for more than seven years has been moving the police from a reactive model to a more preventive one (Serrano-Berthet, 2018).

**Judging the Justice System**

Despite the region’s significant investment in criminal justice, high levels of impunity and preventive detention speak to poor performance. The criminal justice system is highly ineffective and inefficient at apprehending and prosecuting offenders, conducting a quick and effective trial, and carrying out sentencing.
Three out of four (76 percent) homicides in the region go unpunished (Figure 7.25). This is the result of an analysis of homicides and convictions between 2010 and 2015.\(^{10}\) Unfortunately, the calculation is based on fewer than half the countries in the region, given the lack of information.\(^{11}\) Comparatively, in Asia and Europe impunity is 30 percent.

Some 41 percent of people imprisoned in the region do not have a sentence and are under the preventive detention regime.\(^{12}\) Lack of sentencing varies significantly from less than 10 percent in some countries to more than 70 percent in others (Figure 7.26). This is not a new problem. Between 1999 and 2017, the regional average was 44 percent (Figure 7.27). In the last decade, the region introduced important criminal reforms to speed up procedures and trials (Bergman and Fondevila, 2018), which has sparked a downward trend in most cases (Figure 7.28). However, in relative terms, the number of prisoners without conviction remains high.

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\(^{10}\) The methodology for calculating direct impunity is: year X = (100 − [Convicted for intentional homicide in year X / Incidence of intentional homicide in year X]).

\(^{11}\) Brazil, with more than 40 percent of homicides in the region, has statistics on crimes solved in only 6 of the 27 of the federation (Sou da Paz, 2017).

\(^{12}\) Based on data from the World Prison Brief, the number of prisoners without conviction was averaged for the years available in each country in the period 1999 to 2017.

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Figure 7.25 Direct Impunity, Average 2010–2015

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics.
Figure 7.26 Prisoners in Preventive Detention

![Bar chart showing the percentage of imprisonment population in various countries.](image)

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the World Prison Brief.

Figure 7.27 Prisoners without Conviction, Average 1999–2017

![Bar chart showing the percentage of imprisonment population in various countries.](image)

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the World Prison Brief.
Figure 7.28  Prisoners without Conviction, by Country

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>The Bahamas</td>
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<td>Barbados</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(continued on next page)
Figure 7.28 Prisoners without Conviction, by Country (continued)
Figure 7.28  Prisoners without Conviction, by Country  (continued)

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the World Prison Brief.
Note: Figures are elaborated using data available by country.
Reducing unjustified preventive detention is an obvious way to improve the quality of public spending on citizen security. The main benefit would be for people who are unjustifiably imprisoned, both the guilty who need not be preventatively detained, and (even more) the innocent. However, public spending would also benefit by saving the cost of maintaining people in prison. How can preventive detention be used more judiciously? Preventive detention exists to mitigate three potential risks: harm to the community (level of risk), interference with an investigation, or flight. Unfortunately, most judges in Latin America interpret these three risks subjectively. In developed countries, objective instruments are increasingly being used to assess pre-trial risk, along with use of deferment schemes for criminal prosecution (Box 7.3).

High levels of impunity and preventive detention are related to the low capacity to apprehend and prosecute offenders (effective investigation), as well as to judge and sanction the accused (effective adjudication). The Rule of Law Index\(^\text{13}\) prepared by the World Justice Project measures these two indicators (see Figure 7.29). The average of both for the region is a

\(^{13}\) Based on an annual survey with a representative sample of 1,000 respondents in the three largest cities of each country and a set of legal and academic professionals in the country.
Alternatives to Prison

The threat of imprisonment acts as a deterrent to crime not so much because of the severity of the punishment but because of its certainty and speed (Nagin, 2013). Imprisonment, under certain circumstances, can prevent crimes through deterrence and incapacitation. However, its indiscriminate use can lead to situations, as in the United States, where the marginal impact of imprisonment on crime prevention is not significant (Roodman, 2017). To achieve smarter spending on criminal justice services in the region, imprisonment and harsh sentences need to be reserved for the most dangerous offenders, while alternative sanctions apply to non-violent offenders and low-impact offenses (e.g., for nonviolent crimes committed by people with drug addictions and low-risk profiles). Unfortunately, the region is moving in the opposite direction. Between 2002 and 2014, the penitentiary population of the region (17 countries) doubled from almost 600,000 to 1.2 million, an annual growth rate of 8 percent.
and almost six times the population growth rate (1.3 percent). If the prison population continues to grow, by 2030 the region would have in the worst scenario almost 3.4 million people in prison, requiring additional public spending of more than $13 billion over 2014 prison spending (Figure 7.30).

This significant growth of the prison population arises from two simultaneous tendencies: more people entering prisons than exiting them, and judges handing down longer sentences (Bergman and Fondevila, 2018). Prisoners for drug-related offenses have been the fastest-growing subset in recent years, representing 15 percent to 25 percent of the prison population. This type of prisoner has generally committed relatively minor drug offenses—mostly nonviolent—and represents a significant portion of the female prison population. In Argentina, for example, this group grew from 36 percent in 2003 to 59 percent in 2011, and in Brazil from 25 percent in 2005 to 66 percent in 2012 (Bergman and Fondevila, 2018).

Cost-effective alternatives to imprisonment are needed. Almost a quarter of the population in prison for drug offenses worldwide is charged with consumption—not production, trafficking, or sale of illicit drugs.
Addiction can make people act irrationally and illegally or commit a crime to finance their addiction. Passing through jail significantly increases (rather than decreases) the possibility of reoffending, is a very expensive option for the state budget, and can aggravate instead of reduce problematic drug use. Therefore, it is imperative to explore alternative penalties that are less costly for the state and better address problematic drug use.

One alternative is Drug Treatment Courts (DTCs). These specialized courts link subjects that have broken criminal law to an alternative mechanism to the traditional criminal process. They not only send offenders for treatment, but also include intensive judicial supervision that increases user adherence and facilitates the process of change. DTCs can reduce criminal recidivism from traditional prosecution of drug-related crimes by 8 to 12 percentage points. Cost-benefit studies show a social return of $2.84 for each dollar invested. DTCs are popular in the United States, where there are more than 2,000 DTCs serving more than 70,000 people (Kleiman, Caulkins, and Hawken, 2011). In Latin America, Chile is the country with most experience in the area, although other countries in the region also have experiences of varying scope (CICAD, 2015) (see Box 7.4).

**BOX 7.4 DRUG TREATMENT COURTS IN CHILE**

Since 2004, on a pilot basis, and since 2011 as national public policy, the Chilean Ministry of Justice has been coordinating Drug Treatment Courts (DTCs) with the support of the National Service for Prevention and Rehabilitation of Drug and Alcohol Consumption, Public Prosecutor’s Office, Criminal Defense Office, and the judiciary. This program is operating for adults in 29 courts of guarantee in 10 regions of the country and for adolescents in 12 courts of guarantee in eight regions. Between 2008 and 2014, some 1,750 accused people entered the adult DTC program. About 80 percent were men aged 18 to 35. Almost one-third had committed crimes against the drug law, 20 percent battery, 10 percent theft, and 25 percent crimes of domestic violence. The Paz Ciudadana Foundation, with the IDB’s support, carried out the first impact assessment and cost-benefit study in the Latin American context. The assessment is retrospective, quasi-experimental, and measures the criminal recidivism of participants. Impact results show that during the first 12 months after admission, the program reduced criminal recidivism by 8.7 percentage points.


(UNODC, 2016: 102). Addition can make people act irrationally and illegally or commit a crime to finance their addiction. Passing through jail significantly increases (rather than decreases) the possibility of reoffending, is a very expensive option for the state budget, and can aggravate instead of reduce problematic drug use. Therefore, it is imperative to explore alternative penalties that are less costly for the state and better address problematic drug use.

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14 Gutierrez and Bourgon, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2012; Shaffer, 2011; and WSIPP, 2017c.
Implementation: Triggering Reform

To spend better, priority must be given to a more preventive, targeted, and evidence-based portfolio of interventions. At the same time, the efficiency of the police and other agencies in the sector must be improved. Implementing these changes involves many reforms, big and small, easy and difficult. Each country will set the pace and ambition of its reforms. Two systemic and interrelated challenges—one, political, and the other, institutional—need to be addressed for reforms to move forward.

A New Message for Security

The political challenge is to make smart spending on citizen security politically attractive. Many of the reforms proposed in this chapter will not stir up massive support from the public. The pain and fear caused by violence and crime means that the loudest voices in the public space generally speak of repression rather than prevention, revenge rather than justice, punishment rather than remedial penalties. Between 2012 and 2014, the proportion of Latin Americans who prioritized punitive measures increased from 47 percent to 55 percent, while those that prioritized prevention fell from 37 percent to 30 percent (Figure 7.31). Although attitudes vary from country to country, the punitive bent has gained ground in all countries.

Figure 7.31  Citizen Perceptions of How to Deal with Crime

A. 2012

- Implement preventive measures: 15.7%
- Increase punishments: 37.4%
- Both: 46.9%

B. 2014

- Implement preventive measures: 15.2%
- Increase punishments: 29.7%
- Both: 55.1%

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Latin America Public Opinion Project 2014.
This chapter opened with a plea to promote a third way between the “iron fist” and “structural causes of crime” approaches. This third, more pragmatic and scientific way, combines punitive and preventive elements that have been scientifically proven to impact crime. This alternative approach must be communicated in a manner that mobilizes decision-makers, researchers, and civil society into a coalition in favor of smart spending on citizen security. The “smart on crime” movement in the United States is an example of this. It used evidence on the high fiscal cost and ineffectiveness of punitive measures to propose and implement reforms to reduce the excessive punitiveness of the U.S. criminal justice system (Box 7.5).

Getting this message across requires institutional advocates who can effectively communicate what smarter spending on security means. Identifying and enabling these advocates is the institutional challenge. They can come from government, academia, civil society, and/or the private sector. References, inside and outside the region, can serve as examples and inspiration:

**BOX 7.5 MONEY MATTERS: FISCAL PRUDENCE AND NONPUNITIVE REFORMS IN THE UNITED STATES**

According to a recent study, the Great Recession of 2008 in the United States contributed to increase political and public support for nonpunitive reforms in its criminal justice system. In 2009, for the first time in 37 years, the total number of people in prison declined in that country. Since then, the trend has deepened and many states, some with a strong punitive tradition, have begun to abolish or place a moratorium on the death penalty, close prisons and open smaller detention centers, reduce use of solitary confinement, and legalize recreational use of marijuana, among other nonpunitive measures.

The financial crisis inspired a new policy discourse that emphasized costs, frugality, and fiscal prudence, becoming a powerful force in political campaigns and negotiations on public policies. Punitive preferences of the public did not change, but a new message focused on the cost of the reforms emerged, leading to agreements on criminal policy issues that were previously very difficult to obtain, particularly on prison policy. The most frequently used arguments related to the need for improving the quality of criminal justice public spending, replacing punitive correctional policies with low returns for reducing recidivism, with measures to protect citizens, such as imprisoning high-risk offenders and strengthening police investigation to solve violent crimes. These are neutral arguments which neither demonize nor humanize offenders; instead, they show the unproductive cost of poorly designed prosecution and imprisonment policies.

Source: Aviram, 2015.
• **Civil society**: The Brazilian Public Security Forum is a wide and loose network of academics, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, police officers, prosecutors, judges, and security officials from all over Brazil who—through research, information and advocacy campaigns, and discussion forums—influence smarter security policy and spending. Professional associations, such as the College of Policing of Great Britain and the International Association of Police Chiefs, also play a useful role in actively promoting greater coordination between practitioners and academics.

• **Government**: The WSIPP, created by the Washington State Congress, produces cost-effective analyses that regularly inform the state’s security budget; and has been used to justify reallocating resources from building new prisons into programs to reduce criminal recidivism.

• **Academia**: The University of Chicago Crime Lab partners with the city government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to carefully craft innovative crime and violence reduction initiatives, which are rigorously evaluated, and scaled up if found effective through highly visible programs.

• **Private sector**: Through instruments such as social impact bonds, the private sector finances innovative results-based initiatives which can improve the quality of public spending. The United Kingdom’s Peterborough social impact bond, the first in the world, succeeded in reducing reoffending by 9 percent, against a Ministry of Justice target of 7.5 percent, allowing private investors who had funded the service provider to be fully repaid with a 3 percent per annum return (Ainsworth, 2017).

Enabling smart-on-crime advocates to emerge can be done in multiple ways. Improving the infrastructure and quality of data should be at the top of the list—data for targeting high-risk places, people, and behaviors; for measuring the cost-benefit ratio of interventions; for comparing the relative efficiency of police, justice, or prison services; among others.

The advocates for better spending may vary in each country. What should not vary is the effort to spend better. For many Latin Americans, it can be the difference between living or dying, between living with or without fear, between escaping crime or being trapped in it. Much of what needs to be done to spend better is already known. What is missing is a powerful institutional framework to put that knowledge into action.